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Abstract     . 
Prospects for the integration of power markets and the expansion of renewable energy have 
recently triggered a number of publications dealing with transformation scenarios of the North 
African electricity systems. This paper compares five studies using economic electricity 
supply- and demand models to assess possible development pathways of the North African 
power systems from today until 2030 and 2050. The analysis shows that distinct modeling 
methodologies as well as different approaches to scenario design and parameter assumptions 
can strongly influence the studies’ results, leading to very heterogeneous projections of North 
Africa’s power generation structures as well as the patterns of electricity exchange with other 
regions, like Europe. Common findings of the studies are that the surplus costs of capital-
intensive renewable energy expansion in North Africa can in most cases be offset by avoided 
fuel costs and avoided investments in conventional power plants. All studies further agree that 
increased transnational cooperation, notably in terms of market integration and cross-border 
power exchanges, can bring about important economic advantages for the North African 
power sector. Renewable energy expansion could also drive electricity exports to Europe, but 
in integrated power market schemes, such exports only become viable with a very high share 
of renewable energy exceeding 60% of the North African power demand.   
1. Introduction 
Electricity generation from renewable energy sources (RES-E) in North Africa has become a 
prominent topic in the research community. Without doubt, much of the attraction to the issue 
is owed to the high public profile of the ‘Desertec concept’ – the idea of large-scale solar 
power generation from the North African deserts to supply electricity to Europe. The concept, 
promoted by industry players like the Desertec Industrial Initiative (Dii, 2014), the 
Mediterranean power grid initiative Med Grid (2014), but also adopted by high-level policy 
institutions like the Union of the Mediterranean (UfM, 2014), however, remains a subject of 
controversial debate. Despite a general consensus among experts, that renewable energies will 
play a more important role in future North African power systems, the detailed scope of RES-
E deployment remains ambiguous. Opinions particularly diverge about the following 
questions: What is the realistic expansion pathway for RES-E in North Africa, i.e. what level 
of RES-E penetration can technically and economically be achieved at which point of time, 
and how will a future technology mix – renewable, but also conventional/fossil – in electricity 
generation look like? To what extent and under which conditions can electricity exports from 
North Africa actually be realized? 
In the last years, these questions have increasingly been taken up by scientific research, which 
led to the publication of a number of studies on North African power system scenarios. As 
will be shown in this paper, the studies’ approaches as well as their results are very 
heterogeneous, and therefore difficult to compare. This was the motivation to carry out a more 
thorough investigation and systematic appraisal of the publications. Five different studies 
were analyzed, ranging from relatively brief peer-reviewed research papers to large road-
mapping reports from prominent organizations or institutions. In order to present an unbiased 
picture, a common, uniform comparison methodology was applied to assess the studies’ 
scenario building approaches, modeling methods and model outcomes. 
2. History of the North African electricity supply 
Before starting with the analysis of the different scenario studies, it is instructive to have a 
look at the historic development of the North African electricity systems in the past. Over 
several decades, the entire region, encompassing the countries Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Libya and Egypt, has been marked by ever-increasing electricity generation. Annual growth 
rates averaged 8.9% between 1980 and 1990; 4.5% between 1990 and 2000 and 6.4% 
between 2000 and 2012. As can be seen in Figure 1, by far the largest power producer among 
the five countries is Egypt, followed by Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. The 
proportions of these five countries have not changed significantly over the years, although 
economic and demographic parameters as well as population growth and per-capita electricity 
demand vary substantially from country to country1. 
  
 
                                                        
1  Electric power consumption per capita (2011 data, World Bank): Morocco 830 kWh, Algeria 1090 
kWh, Tunisia 1300 kWh, Egypt 1740 kWh, Libya 3930 kWh. Per-capita consumption in the EU is 6030 
kWh. 
 Figure 1. Electricity generation by country. Left: generation in TWh/year, right: percentage proportions. Source: 
IEA, 2013, annual reports of North African electricity utilities 
Looking at the electricity mix by technology (see Figure 2), it becomes apparent that 
electricity generation in North Africa is still substantially based on fossil fuels. Today, the 
dominating source of power generation is natural gas (in 2012: 75% of total North African 
generation). Since the 1980s, natural gas has continuously increased its share in the 
generation mix, pushing the formerly predominant, but inefficient and expensive oil2  based 
generation to the second position (in 2012: 15%). All countries are striving to reduce oil 
usage in power generation, be it for reasons of cost-cutting (Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt are 
net petroleum importers) or to save greater quantities of this strategic fuel for export (in the 
cases of the net oil exporters Algeria and Libya). The shift in the fuel source, from oil to 
natural gas was eased further by important investments into gas extraction and transmission 
infrastructure that many gas-rich North African countries carried out in the 1990s in order to 
promote pipeline-based gas exports. These upgrades also helped to channel more natural gas 
into the domestic power sector, which has seen a boom in gas power plant projects in the last 
two decades. The share of coal in the North African power mix (in 2012: 4%) stems 
exclusively from Morocco, which, being the only North African country without any 
noteworthy hydrocarbon resources, had introduced steam coal power plants back in the 1980s, 
in order to diversify its electricity mix. Hydropower in North Africa (in 2012: 4%), for the 
most part, is supplied by Egyptian Nile river hydroelectricity and Moroccan hydro storage 
power plants. Due to lacking expansion potential, and as other energy sources accelerate 
production, the proportion of hydroelectricity in North Africa’s power mix is set to decline. 
Non-hydro renewables, hardly noticeable in Figure 2, have only recently entered the North 
                                                        
2  In this article, the term ‘oil’ stands for all types petroleum-based liquid fuels (e.g. heavy fuel oil, light 
fuel oil, diesel) that can be used for power generation. 
 
African power systems. Today, the bulk of non-hydro RES-E generation comes from wind 
farms, with Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia being the most important producers of wind energy. 
In 2012, their aggregated wind electricity production amounted to 2.8 TWh, representing 
about 1% of the total North African power generation of 289 TWh.  
 
Figure 2. Electricity generation by source between 1980 and 2012. Left: TWh/year, right: percentage 
proportions. Source: IEA, 2013, annual reports of North African electricity utilities. 
Today, as a result of nationally oriented energy policies, the North African power systems are 
fragmented into five separate electricity markets, mostly ruled by monopolistic state utilities. 
Despite certain efforts to increase regional cooperation and even the desire to form integrated 
power markets in the future (Ben Romdhane et al., 2013), the internal exchanges of electricity 
between the five North African countries are still hovering at a level close to zero (MED-
EMIP, 2010). Somewhat more significant are the electricity exchanges between North Africa 
and its neighboring regions Europe and the Middle East. In 1997 and 1998, first electricity 
interconnectors were built between Morocco and Spain and between Egypt and Jordan. Over 
the past 15 years, the exchange of electricity across these power links has shown a net import 
balance of North Africa, which on average meets around 1% of its demand from abroad (see 
Section 5.4). 
3. Trends, influencing factors and uncertainties of North African 
power system development   
Forecasting the future of North Africa’s electricity generation based on historic developments 
is certainly sketchy, but the observations outlined above nevertheless give some indications 
about likely trends in the near term. One of the trends with the highest inertia is certainly the 
growing electricity demand, which, as the developments of the past have shown, is still far 
from saturation in North Africa. Although exact growth rates are difficult to predict, the 
trajectory in Figure 2, suggests a general continuation of the demand increase. A second, very 
certain pattern concerns the stagnation of hydro power in the North African power mix. 
Furthermore, liquid fuels (fuel oil, diesel) are also set to decrease their contribution to the 
North African electricity mix: Old, inefficient power plants of this type will continuously be 
replaced by more efficient gas power plants.  
Much more uncertainty is associated with the question to what extent can the non-hydro 
renewable energy sources penetrate into the North African power systems. The favorable 
worldwide conditions for RES-E technologies (falling costs, improvements in technology) 
and the immense potential of solar and wind resources in the region speak for an accelerated 
RES-E expansion in the region, clearly going beyond the current 1% contribution to the North 
African power mix. The recent proliferation of renewable target announcements by North 
African governments (REN21, 2013) additionally underscores the generally positive 
prospects for RES-E in the region. However, doubts remain as to whether the ambitious 
policy targets can actually be realized as scheduled – especially in light of the current political 
and economic difficulties following the Arab Spring. A further open question concerns the 
choices of RES-E technologies. Wind power, photovoltaic (PV) and concentrated solar power 
(CSP) are expected to be the leading renewable technologies for bulk power generation in 
North Africa. However, their exact proportions in the future renewable mix are still a matter 
of speculation. 
The same goes for the conventional fuel mix. While natural gas is set to gradually replace oil-
based electricity generation, uncertainty remains about the future of coal in the North African 
power mix. Morocco already operates coal-fired power plants, but for instance Tunisia, 
suffering from declining natural gas reserves has also been deliberating the usage of coal for 
electricity generation (Wuppertal Instiut/Alcor, 2011) – although no final decision on this 
technology has been taken, yet. Whether carbon-intensive technologies will actually garner 
support in the region will certainly also depend on the future stance of national governments 
towards climate policies. Finally, many North African countries have also displayed nuclear 
ambitions in the past (Jewell, 2011) – which, despite the Fukushima disaster and the recent 
political upheavals, have never fully disappeared (Haddad, 2011). A likewise highly 
speculative field is whether the prospects of large-scale intercontinental electricity exchanges, 
in particular with Europe, could shape the features of the North African power system. The 
current situation, as shown above, is mostly characterized by electricity supplied from Europe 
to North Africa. However, proponents of trans-Mediterranean, renewables-based electricity 
systems, postulate that under common political and regulatory frameworks prevailing over the 
entire EU-MENA region, North Africa could in the future become a major (green) electricity 
exporter.   
Table 1. Summary of broad short-term trends, key uncertainties and the main factors influencing the 
development of the North African electricity systems 
Broad short-term trends  Key uncertainties Influencing factors 
Continuation of growth in 
demand  
Stagnation of hydro power 
generation 
Decline of oil-based generation 
in the mix 
Expansion of non-hydro RES-E 
 
Magnitude of non-hydro RES-E 
expansion 
RES-E technology choice (RES-E 
electricity mix) 
Role of coal power 
Role of nuclear power 
Transnational/transcontinental 
electricity transmission.  
Detailed demand growth rates 
 
General political and economic 
situation 
Power plant technology costs 
Fuel costs 
RES-E cost developments and 
economic potential 
Climate policies of North African 
countries 
Regulatory futures, market design 
EU-MENA electricity market 
integration 
Transnational cooperation. 
Social acceptance of electricity 
system transformation strategies.  
 
 
Table 1summarizes the contextual framework for building scenarios on the North African 
power systems. Broad trends for the near-term future – for instance the next decade – can be 
derived from the historic developments described in Section 2. When it comes to the mid- and 
long-term timeframe, e.g. as far as 2030 or 2050, any projection is subject to huge 
uncertainties given the multidimensionality of possible influencing factors. In this context, 
scenario approaches appear to be the only appropriate tool to imagine and understand 
potential futures of the North African power systems. At any rate, scenarios need to be 
designed carefully to be sufficiently robust: This concerns the conception of reasonable 
political and regulatory frameworks for the scenarios, as well as an assessment of the 
technical and economical feasibility of the proposed power system transformation pathways. 
Our article places a particular emphasis on the latter requirement, by assessing publications 
and reports that use techno-economic energy system modeling methods to portray North 
African power system transformations.  
4.  Overview of North African electricity system scenario studies  
The literature on RES-E in North Africa has significantly increased in the past few years. 
Back in the 1990s, energy researchers had started to recognize the huge unexploited solar and 
wind potential in North Africa and developed strategies how these resources could be 
harnessed. Early studies were published on this topic in the 1990s by Staiss et al. (1994) and 
Knies et al. (1999), being the first to propose the exploitation of the North Africa’s renewable 
energies to supply Europe. Czisch (2005) and a series of studies by the German Aerospace 
Center (DLR 2005, 2006 and 2009), explored large-scale renewable energy generation in the 
North African region in more detail, likewise including an assessment of the feasibility of 
RES-E exports to Europe. The leadership of mostly European (German) scholars with their 
strong stance on electricity exports, has been criticized, for instance, by Supersberger et al. 
(2010) who state that the ‘Western’ reasoning about North African electricity issues would 
exhibit a ”too simplified understanding of the political dynamics in the region, largely 
disregarding the behavior and aims of local actors and stakeholders”. Indeed, most of the 
above-mentioned studies – and many others that followed 3  – have been predominantly 
deliberating on North Africa’s potential for exporting renewable electricity, but neglected the 
question how renewable energies can be integrated into domestic power generation schemes. 
The present analysis is intended to assess only studies that take North African electricity 
needs into consideration; if power exchanges between neighboring regions (Europe, Middle 
East) occur, they must take place in a generalized supply-demand regime of integrated 
electricity systems – not purely for export purposes. By and large, the study is therefore 
limited to publications that fulfill the following requirements:   
• Modeling of supply and demand in integrated electricity systems. The model must 
consider the domestic power demand in North Africa. Not admitted are studies that 
only focus on renewable export options (e.g. May, 2005, Trieb et al., 2012, Brancucci 
et al., 2013)  or treat North Africa as a simplified satellite region for the power supply 
of Europe (EWI/Energynautics, 2011) without sufficiently taking into account 
domestic electricity consumption patterns.  
• Multi-regional modeling: The geographical scope of the studies must cover all five 
North African countries. Studies that focus only on single countries or smaller clusters 
of North African countries, for example the Maghreb region (Mercados, 2011; Brand 
and Zingerle, 2010), are not considered.   
                                                        
3  For example May (2005), Trieb et al. (2012), and Brancucci et al. (2013) are export-focused studies.   
• Inter-temporal modeling: The model must be able to treat power system 
transformation in a dynamic manner over large timescales starting from the status quo 
of fossil fuel-based power system infrastructures in North Africa into the future. Not 
considered are static ‘greenfield approaches’ that assess the feasibility of electricity 
system infrastructures at a fixed target year, for example 2050, but omit modeling the 
respective investment pathways towards such system configurations over the 
intervening years (Dii, 2012; Boie et al., 2014 or Huber et al., 2012),.    
A further requirement was that the studies must be sufficiently recent (not older than 5 years) 
in order to reflect latest developments on North African power markets and to ensure a 
minimum up-to-datedness of the modeling parameters, e.g. technology costs or fuel prices. At 
the time of writing, five publications were found that meet these requirements (see Table 2).  
4.1. Dii (2013) 
The study ‘Desert Power - Getting Started’, a non-peer-reviewed policy roadmap report, 
explores the transformation of the EU-MENA electricity system to an unprecedented degree 
of comprehensiveness. Contrary to a previous publication (Dii, 2012), titled ‘Desert Power: 
2050’, the updated study not only demonstrates the feasibility of an (almost) fully RES-E-
based trans-continental electricity network by 2050 – it also provides insights into the details 
of the transformation processes needed to achieve this end-state. The authors use the cost-
minimizing linear programming model PowerACE, developed by the Fraunhofer Institute for 
Systems and Innovation Research (ISI), to calculate the optimized power plant dispatch for all 
8760 hours of the year across 42 interconnected countries in Europe and the MENA region. 
Investments into power generation assets and cross-country transmission capacities are 
endogenously optimized in 10-year intervals, while respecting technological boundary 
conditions, but also market diffusion constraints. The existing power plant fleet of all 
involved countries as well as their self-set renewable energy goals by 2020, were taken into 
consideration. Most essentially, by the year 2050, an overall emission cap of 194 Mt per year 
(amounting to average specific emissions of 24 g CO2 / kWh) must be achieved by the entire 
EU-MENA power system, which is equivalent to approximately 90% emission reductions 
compared to 2010 levels. The model uses this central constraint to back-cast the power system 
transformation between 2020 and 2050 and to calculate the necessary additions in renewable 
power plant capacity. For the North African countries, eligible RES-E technologies are on-
shore wind power, PV and CSP power plants. Dii’s report contrasts two basic scenarios 
against each other: One ‘Connected’ case, where the model is allowed to build additional 
transmission capacities between MENA power systems and the EU, and one ‘Disconnected’ 
scenario, where such interconnections are suppressed. An additional scenario variant is the 
‘Inertia’ scenario. Here, connections between MENA and EU power systems may be realized, 
but in a less extensive manner, as the level of transnational cooperation is assumed to be low 
and climate action less ambitious.  
4.2. Brand (2013) 
The article ‘Transmission topologies for the integration of renewable power in the electricity 
systems of North Africa’, published in 2013, likewise employs a cost-minimizing linear 
dispatch- and investment modeling approach with an hourly dispatch resolution to explore 
cost-optimized transformation pathways of the EU-MENA power systems. Having a clear 
focus on North African power systems, the study features a less refined geographical scope 
than Dii’s Getting Started study (Dii, 2013), covering only the 5 North African countries in 
detail, while Europe, as well as the Middle East and Turkey are treated as simplified model 
regions. Moreover, the study is limited to mid-term expansion pathways with a time horizon 
of 2030. The scenario projections are based on a forecasting approach by which the national 
RES-E expansion histories, as well as the national renewable energy goals of the North 
African governments were extrapolated until 2030. The model calculated investments in 
generation capacities and transnational interconnectors in 5-year intervals, while the daily 
dispatch as well as the power flows between the countries were simulated on an hourly scale 
for 24 representative days (576 time segments or ‘time slices’ per year) in order to take 
account of the intermittency and seasonal variability of RES-E technologies. One central aim 
of the study was to analyze the benefits of transnational cooperation on electricity markets. 
Therefore, simulations were carried out for two different sub-scenarios distinguishing 
different levels of transnational cooperation and the willingness to set up and share 
transmission capacities between the North African countries.  
4.3. Fragkos et al. (2012a) 
Researchers at the University of Athens, Greece published a journal article in 2012 dealing 
with scenarios for the energy systems of the ‘MED-9’ countries (five North African countries, 
plus Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Israel). Titled ‘Model-based analysis of the future strategies 
for the MENA energy system’, the publication in large parts corresponds to a previous, EU-
funded study by the same authors (Fragkos et al., 2012b)  that explored the impact of four 
different high-level trends until 2030 for the South Mediterranean region: (1) A “Reference 
Scenario”, characterized by no noteworthy climate action, a continuation of the present 
energy policies, and only moderate achievements in terms of RES-E expansion and 
international cooperation; (2) a scenario labeled “MED-EU Initiatives” where the MED-9 
region – through EU support and integrated climate and energy policies – makes substantial 
progress in terms of RES-E expansion, even resulting in electricity exports to Europe. The 
“Global Integration” scenario (3) also assumes enhanced efforts with regards to RES-E 
deployment and climate action, but cooperation mostly takes place in a global, multilateral 
context, without particular support from the EU. (4) The “Fragmentation” scenario is the most 
pessimistic case. It postulates a negative macro-economic future for clean energies: Political 
instability and conflicts hold sway in the region, leading to high risk premiums and a 
generalized capital shortage – ultimately constraining the countries to maintain and expand 
existing oil, natural gas or coal power plants instead of investing in renewable electricity 
generation technologies. All four scenario cases were modeled with the MENA-EDS model, a 
partial energy market equilibrium model, which had been tailored specifically to portray the 
MENA region’s energy system transformation 4  . As the model covers the entire energy 
system, not only the electricity sector (which is regarded as a sub-sector of the energy 
system), the temporal resolution of the power plant dispatch modeling is comparatively low, 
with only 9 distinct time segments per year. However, the MENA-EDS model indirectly 
accounts for the interactions between the structure of the power generation system and the 
evolution of energy supply and demand. For example, massive penetration of PV and CSP 
technologies in power generation results in changes in generation costs and in electricity 
prices for end consumers, and thus to changes in the evolution of electricity demand over 
time. 
4.4.  Haller et al. (2012) 
As the study’s title ‘Decarbonization scenarios for the EU and MENA power systems’ 
indicates, Haller et al. focus on climate policy-motivated scenarios. Similar to Dii’s Getting 
Started study, the authors proceed from the assumption that strong restrictions on carbon 
emissions – 90% reduction by 2050 compared to the 2010 levels – hold sway over the EU-
MENA power systems. The research paper also resembles Dii’s study in other ways: Having 
                                                        
4  The MENA-EDS system is basically a derivative of the PRIMES model, which had been used to 
simulate EU energy policy scenarios in a study by Capros et al. (2014) 
the same time horizon (2050) and using the same modeling approach (linear optimization), 
both studies also discriminate between the same connection scenarios for the intercontinental 
transmission systems: A fully integrated, interconnected EU-MENA power system is 
compared against a scenario where both continents remain without any noteworthy 
transmission links. The interconnected scenario is labeled “PolGrid”, whereas “PolNoGrid” 
stands for the case where transcontinental power line projects do not materialize. Simulations 
were carried out with the LIMES-EU+ model, developed by the Potsdam Institute for Climate 
Impact Research (PIK). Within the geographical outreach of this model are 19 different EU-
MENA regions; but only two that represent North Africa: Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are 
aggregated into one single model region, Libya and Egypt into the other. The model’s 
temporal resolution considers 49 different time slices per year, consisting of 12 characteristic 
days in 6-hour intervals plus one additional ‘super peak’ time slice to cover the case where 
low renewable supply meets high electricity demand. Investments into power system 
infrastructure – power plants and transmission lines – were simulated in 10-year intervals. 
4.5. OME (2011) 
Authored by the France-based Observatoire Méditerranéen de l’Energie (OME), the non-peer-
reviewed publication ‘Mediterranean Energy Perspectives’ presents mid-term energy system 
forecasts for the Mediterranean region up to 2030. The analysis covers a total of 24 countries 
adjacent to the Mediterranean Basin, including the five North African countries. OME 
simulates energy demand-supply equilibriums for the entire energy system by using an 
econometric model (called Mediterranean Energy Model, MEM). In OME’s model, the 
electricity system is – similar to Fragkos et al.’s study – being viewed as a sub-system of the 
whole energy system. Expansion of power plant capacity is optimized with a linear 
programming algorithm minimizing electricity generation costs. Electricity supply/demand is 
calculated in terms of total, aggregated values without particular consideration of the temporal 
dynamics (dispatch) of the power system. OME’s model considers the following generation 
technologies: coal, nuclear, natural gas, hydro, wind and solar power. No difference is made 
between CSP and PV technologies which are both subsumed under the term ‘solar power’. 
OME’s study compares two scenarios: A “Conservative” scenario, characterized by a 
continuation of current policies and rather low efforts towards renewable energy deployment. 
The “Proactive” scenario, by contrast, stands for strong achievements in the area of energy 
efficiency and successful implementation of renewable energy projects. In both the 
Conservative as well as the Proactive scenario, OME’s study considers nuclear power a 
realistic option for the North African power systems, with nuclear power plants being 



























 5. Comparison 
This section summarizes the studies’ most significant differences, starting with the 
assumptions on electricity demand, the generation mixes, carbon emissions, the economic 
costs and the prospect for electricity exports by North African countries.  
5.1. Electricity demand 
One of the most important factors influencing electricity system modeling is the electricity 
demand. While there appears to be a consensus that the historic trend of increase in demand 
will remain unbroken over the next decades, the actually forecasted projections drastically 
diverge from study to study (see Figure 3) – an indicator that the underlying mechanisms and 
drivers of the North African electricity demand are still not very well explored. To illustrate 
the high discrepancies, Figure 3 depicts projections of the Dii study ‘Desert Power 2050’ (Dii, 
2012), the precursor of Dii’s ‘Getting Started’ study (Dii, 2013), which exhibits a 
tremendously high differential of North African power demand forecasts, ranging from 511 
TWh to 1273 TWh by 2050. The high demand scenario rests on historic statistical data of the 
Arab Union of Electricity, while the assumptions for the low demand result from 
extrapolations of the “450 Policies” scenario of IEA’s World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2011). 
Both demand assumptions were later rectified in the “Getting Started” study, where a 
common value, 994 TWh/a, was used as the base for further electricity system modeling. 
Haller et al. (2012) propose a lower demand, 721 TWh/a, calculated on the basis of historic 
annual growth rates for the North African power demand5. 
 
                                                        
5  Haller et al. (2012) assume that historic demand growth rates linearly decrease to zero until 2050. This 
results in an average annual demand growth rate of 2.7% between 2010 and 2050. For the same period, 
demand in Dii Getting Started grows by 3.5% annually. Fragkos et al. (2012a) calculated an average 
demand growth of 5.8% per year between 2010 and 2030, while the OME (2011) Proactive scenario 
assumes an annual demand growth of 3.5% in the same time period. 
 Figure 3. Cumulated net electricity demand (in TWh/a) of the five North African countries.  
Contrary to the above-described extrapolation approaches applied by the 2050 scenario 
studies, the publications with a time horizon until 2030 appear to use more refined demand 
evaluation methods. In Fragkos et al. (2012a), for instance, electricity demand is 
endogenously calculated by a supply-demand equilibrium model based on demographic and 
macroeconomic forecasts for the North African economies. Here, the demand projections 
range from 560 to 771 TWh/a by 2030. OME (2011) likewise applies a bottom-up approach, 
based on GDP and population growth parameters, to calculate the future North African 
electricity demand. OME’s baseline scenario (“Conservative Scenario”) assumes a demand of 
596 TWh/a by 2030, while the “Proactive Scenario”, due to increased energy efficiency, 
suggests a lower demand of 491 TWh/a. Brand (2013) does not carry out its own demand 
assessments, but uses the demand of OME’s baseline scenario (596 TWh/a by 2030) for 
power system modeling. 
5.2. Electricity generation mix  
It is insightful to compare the different studies’ resulting power generation mixes. The 
proportions of the energy sources, as illustrated in Figure 4, give indications about the 
underlying scenario assumptions and model particularities – and even reveal preferences with 
regards to the technology choices for the North African power systems. The data displayed in 
Figure 4 was retrieved directly from the publications, or was kindly provided by the authors 
of the studies.  
  
Figure 4. Electricity generation mix of all five North African countries by source, in the different scenario 
studies (values in TWh/a). Left: studies with 2030 time horizon, right: 2050 scenario studies. 
5.2.1. Generation mix of the 2030 studies 
For 2030, all studies forecast an increasing penetration of non-hydro renewable energies in 
the North African power generation mix. Even in the most pessimistic case, the 
“Fragmentation” scenario of Fragkos et al. (2012a), the contribution of wind and solar power 
at around 25 TWh is significantly higher than the current production, which hardly reaches 3 
TWh. The scenario with the highest projected non-hydro RES-E production (481 TWh in 
2030) is the “MED-EU initiatives” scenario, also by Fragkos et al. The authors assert that the 
tremendous RES-E growth rates needed to reach this high level6 can be achieved by extensive 
                                                        
6  This expansion would require very high annual growth rates for RES-E of over 30%. These are not 
unrealistic, as similar growth rates have already been reached in the last two decades in other renewable 
energy markets, for instance in Germany or Spain. 
efforts of North African governments towards climate action and also by massive foreign 
direct investments (FDI) into renewable power plant projects in North Africa. A major driver 
for these investments would be EU-supported large-scale green power export schemes from 
MENA countries to Europe. Most remarkable output in all four scenarios of Fragkos et al. is 
the strong expansion of CSP, clearly outrivaling wind and photovoltaic power production. 
The authors explain this to be the result of ‘special support’ CSP technology would receive in 
the MENA region, going much beyond the support for wind farms. Likewise, it is claimed 
that PV expansion is less systematically pursued, because PV could only be built in relatively 
small units and must be connected cost-inefficiently to the low and medium voltage grid. 
Although this argument is not fully valid – all over the world, an increasing number of PV 
power plants already reach the multi-MW scale, including high-voltage grid connection – the 
CSP bias exhibited by Fragkos et al.’s scenarios in a certain way reflects the current 
preferences of governments and financiers: Despite dropping prices for PV, international 
development banks tend to support CSP in the region, while MENA governments continue to 
stick to dispatchable, storage-based CSP technologies in their renewable electricity roadmaps 
(e.g., World Bank, 2011). OME (2011) and Brand (2013) forecast a relatively moderate 
expansion of solar electricity, giving clear priority to wind power as the least-cost RES-E 
supply option. The same is true for the studies by Haller et al. (2012) and Dii (2013), which 
likewise clearly favor an initial expansion of wind power on the pathway towards 
decarbonized North African electricity systems.    
Most scenarios agree about natural gas being the main energy carrier for the conventional part 
of the North African power mixes until 2030. An exception is the study of Haller et al., which 
projects a comparatively strong penetration of coal power (between 20% and 32% of the 
generation mix), combined with a large share of wind power (56%), but virtually no PV and 
CSP contribution. The reason for this surprising ‘wind-coal’ symbiosis (with a few amount of 
natural gas needed for balancing) is the still incomplete process of decarbonization by 2030. 
Carbon emissions are still allowed to a certain extent by the model constraints; therefore the 
model seeks a cost-minimizing combination consisting of coal power generation (due to low 
fuel prices) and wind power as the cheapest low-carbon technology. In the subsequent years, 
with the carbon constraint becoming more and more restrictive, electricity production using 
coal will gradually decline (see Section 5.2.2.). Somehow puzzling is the nuclear power 
supply put forth by OME (2011) in both the “Proactive” and “Conservative” scenarios. From 
the current perspective, looking at the long lead times for nuclear power plant construction 
and the instable political situation in the region as well as a rising public resistance against 
nuclear power even in MENA countries (see Haddad, 2011) it appears rather unlikely that 
nuclear power could come into gear in North Africa as early as 2030.  
5.2.2. Generation mix in the 2050 studies 
As already mentioned, the two studies with 2050 as the horizon, Haller et al. (2012) and Dii 
Getting Started  (Dii, 2013), resemble each other in the modeling methodology (both employ 
linear programming techniques under similar exogenous carbon emission constraints) and 
with regard to the scenario design: Haller et al.’s “PolGrid” and Dii’s “Connected” scenario 
assume an interconnected EU-MENA electricity system, while in the 
“PolNoGrid”/“Disconnected” scenarios, transcontinental interconnectors are suppressed by 
model constraints. Despite these similarities, the results of the two studies show surprising 
divergences. The most distinguishing feature is the clear prevalence of wind production in 
Dii’s 2050 mix compared to Haller et al. In all of Dii’s scenarios (depicted in Figure 4), 
onshore wind takes the largest share of the total power generation of North Africa – between 
57% and 72%; Haller et al.’s wind contribution of 23% to 42% remains significantly below 
that. We explain these differences through a substantial cleavage in the studies’ wind potential 
assumptions. In Dii’s study, wind generation in North Africa features around 2700 average 
full load hours by 2050, while the wind prospects in Haller et al. are much less optimistic with 
an average of only 1660 full load hours7 . It is obvious that under the regime of least-cost 
modeling, this difference renders wind power much more attractive in the Dii scenario, 
explaining the resulting higher wind penetration in Dii’s study. In consequence, Dii’s 
scenarios forecast a clearly more moderate expansion of solar power in the North African 
generation mix, reaching only a maximum of 26% in the “Connected” scenario. In Haller et 
al.’s scenarios on the other hand, CSP and PV make up particularly large portions of the 
power supply (51% to 68%) – which means a radical change compared to the situation in 
2030 where wind still dominates (see Chapter 5.2.1). Likewise remarkable are the different 
proportions of PV and CSP in the electricity mixes. While in the paper of Haller et al. solar 
electricity production is mostly oriented towards PV, in Dii’s study, a clear preference for 
CSP can be observed. CSP penetration is particularly strong in the “Connected” scenario, 
where the North African region exports huge amounts of electricity (see Chapter 5.4.). 
Apparently, the interconnected scheme favors the installation of dispatchable CSP plants 
                                                        
7  A likely reason for this is that both studies use different sources and methodologies for wind power 
assessment (Haller et al.: NCEP/NCAR wind velocity data of 2009, calculated at 80m hub height, Dii: 
MERRA wind data of 2007, hub height 120m) 
offering a higher capability to cater for supply/demand balancing across the different regions 
of the EU-MENA electricity system.  
5.3. Carbon emissions 
Contrary to most western countries, where the question of carbon emissions reduction is 
raised in almost any debate about future energy supply schemes, this issue has so far been 
widely neglected in the approaches to electricity planning of the MENA countries. The 
scientific literature also barely mirrors the theme: Carbon emission abatement has so far been 
addressed only by a few MENA researchers (examples Chedid et al., 2001, El Fadel et al., 
2012), while western scholars traditionally put more emphasis on this topic. This is also true 
for the studies analyzed in this paper: Dii (2013) and Haller et al. (2012) explicitly utilize 
exogenous carbon constraints as the initial position of their modeling approaches for the EU-
MENA electricity system; OME (2011) considers an increased decoupling of carbon 
emissions from economic growth in its “Proactive” Scenario, while Fragkos et al. (2012a) 
assume an emissions trading system (ETS) in the “MED-EU initiatives” scenario with carbon 
prices also applying to the MENA power sector. A good way to illustrate the consequences of 
these normative carbon reduction scenarios for the electricity systems is to compare the 
forecasted emissions of the North African power system with the historic values over the past 
three decades. Figure 5 depicts the specific carbon emissions in g/kWh from 1980 until 2010 
(historic values based on IEA, 2012) as well as the projections of the different scenarios for 
2030 and 2050.  
Figure 5. Specific direct CO2 emissions of the North African power systems (kg/MWh). Values only include 
direct CO2 emissions from fuel combustion in power plants, not life
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mix. As depicted in Figure 5, most scenarios – except for OME’s “Conservative” and 
Fragkos’s “Reference” and “Fragmentation” scenarios – afford a very optimistic outlook in 
this regard, predicting a substantial acceleration of emissions reduction in 2030 and 2050, 
compared to the current trend.  
5.4. Transmission / electricity exports 
Very often, discussions about the expansion of renewable energy in the MENA region are 
motivated by the prospect of physical exports of green electricity to Europe. Advocates of this 
concept assert that the high solar and wind potential in the Southern Mediterranean would 
render renewable power generation in this region more competitive than in Europe; by 
importing cheap green electricity from North Africa, so the argument goes, European 
countries – especially those not so well-endowed with renewable resources – could achieve 
their RES-E targets more cost-efficiently. This rationale has even been taken up at the 
political level, for instance by the EU’s Directive on Renewable Energies (2009) which 
explicitly allows EU member states to include RES-E of non-EU origin into their national 
renewable energy accounting. Despite the presence of this export-enabling framework, the 
actual reality of North-South electricity transmission looks completely different: For more 
than 15 years now, North Africa has been a net importer of electricity. At the moment, the 
main electricity import corridor is an interconnection between Spain and Morocco through 
which Morocco imported 4.9 TWh in 2012 (ONEE, 2012)8 , representing around 19% of 
Morocco’s national electricity demand. The reason why imports from Europe are presently so 
attractive for North Africa, are price differentials between the North African and European 
electricity systems9. Compared to the gas- and oil-dominated North African power systems, 
European countries can often produce electricity at lower costs, because their power plant 
fleets comprise comparatively more coal, lignite or nuclear power plants – all of which 
operate at low marginal costs. Additionally, the increased penetration of renewable energies 
into the European power markets brings down prices at the power spot markets (due to the 
‘merit order effect’, Sensfuß et al., 2008), and thus increases the attractiveness of selling 
power abroad to North Africa. What could be done to reverse this picture, i.e. to increase the 
economic attractiveness of electricity transmission from North Africa to Europe? It seems 
                                                        
8  To a much lesser extent, electricity exchanges also take place at the eastern end of North Africa: In 
2012 Egypt, exported around 780 GWh electricity to Jordan (NEPCO, 2012). 
9  For example, Morocco current procures electricity at the Iberian power exchange OMEL because prices 
are on average 9 €/MWh cheaper than the domestic power generation costs in Morocco (Thiam, 2013). 
obvious that to achieve a situation where the markets would favor power flowing from the 
South to the North, substantially more generation capacity at comparatively lower generation 
costs than in Europe (e.g., RES-E capacity) must be installed in North Africa. Theoretically, 
as the RES-E penetration increases, a point should be reached where the North African power 
generation costs could undercut the costs of European generation (including the costs of 
transcontinental electricity transmission). From the modeling perspective, it is particularly 
interesting to quantify what level of RES-E expansion would enable exports from North 
Africa. 
 
Figure 6. North African net power exports as a function of RES-E penetration (both in percent of the total 
electricity demand). 
Figure 6 summarizes the power exchange projections of the different scenario studies. The net 
electricity exports of North Africa to its neighbor regions Europe and the Middle East are 
plotted against the renewable share of the North African power demand at different points in 
time. It can be observed that up to a level where RES-E covers only around 60% of the North 
African demand, all studies predict relatively low exports – or even net electricity imports. 
For instance in the Dii “Inertia” scenario (data point VIII), North Africa remains a net 
importer by 2030, with 14% of its electricity demand being imported. The paper by Brand 
(data point I) likewise forecasts net electricity imports by North Africa, though only 
amounting to less than 1% of its overall electricity demand by 2030. Noteworthy electricity 
exports out of North Africa start when the RES-E generation share in demand exceeds the 
60% level: Beyond this threshold, electricity exports significantly increase. Dii’s “Inertia” 
scenario even performs a remarkable turnaround of the North African electricity transmission 
patterns: While still being a substantial importer of electric energy in 2030 (VIII), by 2050 the 
region becomes a net exporter (X), sending around 36% of its electricity demand abroad - 
mostly to Europe, but partially also to the Middle East region and to Saudi Arabia (which 
only Dii included in the modeling). The switch from imports to exports is realized once there 
is a reversion of the power generation cost differentials between North Africa and the adjacent 
regions. Among all scenarios, the most substantial exports are forecast by Dii’s “Connected” 
case (IX), where a very much larger amount of electricity, equivalent to 68% of North 
Africa’s demand can be exported by 2050. A value rendering the picture of Figure 6 somehow 
ambiguous is the data point XII, where the “PolGrid” scenario of Haller et al. projects a 
significantly lower North African export rate (only 14% of the North African demand10), 
despite a relatively high penetration of renewables. This can be explained with the relatively 
restrictive exogenous constraints concerning trans-Mediterranean grid expansion set by Haller 
et al. In the North-South direction, Haller et al.’s model only allows three transmission 
corridors, while Dii’s model can add interconnectors at 12 different geographical locations 
across the Mediterranean. Additionally, Haller et al. limit the model’s transmission options to 
alternating current transmission (HVAC) instead of high voltage direct current (HVDC) 
technologies – even for subsea interconnectors – which entails higher losses along the 
transmission path, and hence reduces the attractiveness of electricity exports from North 
Africa to Europe.   
 
Generally, it can be stated that due to the heterogeneity of the assumptions and modeling 
approaches, it is rather difficult to draw final conclusions about the exact conditions needed 
for North African power systems to perform substantial electricity exports. Increasing the 
RES-E penetration to higher levels  as shown above – certainly is one precondition, but 
definitely not the exclusive factor for leveraging electricity exports out of North Africa. Much 
will also depend on the power system transformations in the other regions adjacent to North 
Africa. This not only concerns Europe11, but also the Middle East and even the Gulf region, 
which are striving for RES-E expansion as well. Scenarios examining the interaction of these 
power systems with the one in North Africa (e.g. through new interconnections between 
                                                        
10  From the European perspective, the electricity transfers from North Africa into 2050 account only for 
2% of the European demand in Haller et. al’s “PolGrid” scenario against 14% in Dii’s “Connected 
scenario”. 
11  Most studies assume that RES-E expansion in Europe follows the EU National Renewable Energy 
Action Plans (NREAP). 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia12 ) are at the moment not sufficiently explored and further research in 
this area is undoubtedly needed. It goes without saying that the ‘export question’ cannot be 
answered with economic models alone, as it touches upon much more wide-ranging issues 
such as the political willingness of the involved countries to cooperate and the effectiveness 
of regulatory measures to enable transnational electricity exchange.   
5.5. Economic costs 
All five studies contain discussions of the economic costs associated with power system 
transformation. However, the results can only very roughly be compared, as each model uses 
its own cost metrics and its own assumptions for discount factors, technology costs and fuel 
price developments. Furthermore, the studies’ results are often displayed in such a way, that 
the cost incurred by the North African countries cannot clearly be discerned: Only Brand 
(2013) exclusively focuses on the five North African countries; OME (2011) and Fragkos et 
al. (2012a) link their cost results to the group of MED-24 or the MED-9 countries, while Dii 
(2013) and Haller et al. (2012) aggregate the costs of the entire EU-MENA region. Due to 
these differences, this chapter can only draw some general conclusions about the studies’ 
most significant cost patterns.  
Most studies demonstrate that renewable energy integration in North Africa is an 
economically viable business case compared to strategies of conventional power system 
expansion. Avoided investments in conventional power plants and avoided costs for fossil 
fuels have the potential to offset the investments in capital-intensive RES-E expansion. For 
instance, OME’s study reveals that between 2012 and 2030, the renewable-friendly 
“Proactive” scenario brings about natural gas savings worth €100bn for the Southern 
Mediterranean region. These savings largely exceed the additional costs of renewable energy 
investments (€30bn, compared to the “Conservative” scenario) – resulting in net savings on 
the order of €70bn. Fragkos et al.’s study also confirms the finding that renewable energy 
expansion can be a financially attractive alternative, especially if seen in light of the heavy 
fossil fuel subsidies that many MENA economies are shouldering to keep energy prices low. 
Until the time horizon of 2030, the scenarios “MED-EU Integration” and “Global 
Integration”, both characterized by strong RES-E ambitions and an accelerated removal of 
energy subsidies, accumulate total system cost savings for the MED-9 countries of more than 
                                                        
12  A 3000 MW submarine interconnection project between Saudi Arabia and Egypt is currently under 
construction. 
€150bn compared to the fossil fuel-dominated “Reference” scenario that features only a 
partial removal of energy subsidies.  
It must be mentioned that the above-described positive cost outlooks for renewable 
integration are only valid in the scenarios where renewable energy penetration in the 
electricity mix is still relatively moderate. If wind and solar technologies fully take over 
power generation (nearing 100% RES-E supply as in Dii, 2013 or Haller et al., 2012 ), 
increased costs for the overall system are the consequence due to higher requirements in 
transmission capacity, higher curtailment of intermittent power generation and a greater need 
for storage-bound RES technologies, such as cost-intensive CSP plants. Hence, the ‘last 
percentage points’ to reach a fully renewable-based power system are the most expensive – 
also for the North African power systems. In Dii’s study, the costs of reaching an almost 
100% renewable energy supply (the “Connected” scenario by 2050) are higher by €23bn 
compared to the “Inertia” scenario with a relatively lower share of RES-E. Haller et al.’s 
decarbonization scenarios likewise demonstrate (by means of cumulative distribution 
functions of electricity prices) that very high RES-E penetration comes at additional costs for 
the EU-MENA region. 
A second finding is that increased cooperation and integrated system planning generally 
reduces the costs of power system transformation. The effect of cooperation on 
interconnected power systems and market integration in North Africa is, for instance, 
analyzed by Brand (2013) who contrasted two cases of cooperation for the North African 
region: one with strong efforts to integrate power markets and the joint use of transnational 
interconnectors for electricity exchanges; the other with only low-profile cooperation. The 
results indicate that the effect of cooperative behavior and mutual use of transnational power 
transmission results in benefits of around €3.4bn by 2030. Haller et al. also examined the cost 
advantages of integrated power systems. Although the authors focus on the entire EU-MENA 
region and not exclusively the five North African countries, clear benefits of cooperation can 
be observed: In a cooperative environment (“PolGrid”), average electricity prices in 2050 are 
approximately 13% lower than in the “PolNoGrid” scenario where transcontinental 
transmission grid expansion is suppressed. Clear cost benefits of EU-MENA power system 
integration are also the result of Dii’s study Getting Started (Dii, 2013), which calculated 5% 
lower electricity prices for the “Connected” compared to the “Disconnected” scenario, which 
disables interconnectors between Europe and the MENA region.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper has analyzed five different studies dealing with long-term renewable energy 
expansion scenarios for the North African electricity systems. All studies employ techno-
economic energy system modeling techniques. This ensures that the proposed transformation 
pathways stay technically feasible and economically optimized over the long time scales of 
the scenarios. The appeal of such quantitative models is that they produce tangible, 
‘calculated’ results – making them attractive for stakeholders to prove the cogency of their 
studies while conveying recommendations to policy makers. Weaknesses, however, lie in the 
manifold possibilities of influencing the model outcomes, e.g. by modifying parameter 
settings or by applying exogenous, normative constraints to the modeling process. Often, the 
high degree of technical sophistication of models conceals that scenario outcomes can be 
influenced by a priori assumptions of the modelers. As our paper shows, many studies build 
on constraints set by the authors. The studies with a 2050 scenario horizon, for example, 
assume the success of climate action in the North African region and the opening of cross-
continental electricity markets to electricity transmission over large distances. Not 
surprisingly, such assumptions lead to model results suggesting large-scale RES-E expansion 
in the region – even exceeding the domestic power demand of North Africa itself. The three 
2030 scenario studies exhibit more moderate perspectives for RES-E integration, because 
their forecasting approaches still consider an important contribution of conventional, fossil 
fuel-based, power generation. In these studies, diverging outlooks are observed for the future 
of coal and nuclear power in North Africa. In all studies, i.e. the 2030 as well as the 2050 
scenarios, there also is no coherent picture of RES-E technology preferences in the North 
African electricity mix. The results diverge on the expected proportions of solar and wind 
technologies: While some studies favor wind power, the others give preference to solar PV 
and,  particularly, CSP technologies. A high degree of heterogeneity across all studies is also 
observed with regards to the options of North African countries to export electricity.  
 
Despite these discrepancies, it can be stated that the five publications constitute a highly 
valuable contribution to the current research on North African electricity strategies. The 
studies demonstrate in a coherent and robust manner that RES-E integration into the regional 
power systems is technically and economically feasible – even up to very high degrees of 
penetration. By examining the conditions and limitations of these schemes within integrated 
power systems, the studies also shed more light on the viability of electricity exports to 
Europe. For instance, it is certainly helpful for North African energy planners to know that 
integrated EU-MENA electricity markets can only enable large-scale electricity exports to 
Europe, if very high levels of RES-E penetration are reached in North Africa. Consequently, a 
delayed RES-E expansion would result in a postponement of potential power exports. Thanks 
to the inter-temporal modeling approaches, these interdependencies are better understood.  
Of course, techno-economic models can only describe system transformation pathways within 
specific scenario frameworks. For this meta-analysis, it was an opportune coincidence that the 
presented studies cover a broad variety of scenarios: ranging from optimistic, vision-driven 
scenarios to rather dismal frameworks characterized by political instability and regulatory 
constraints. It is true that at the moment, the situation mostly corresponds to the latter case, as 
many North African countries are still shaken by instability and economic downturn 
following the events of the Arab Spring. In this context it might be helpful to keep in mind 
that, setting aside the promise of large transcontinental export schemes, it would be 
economically beneficial for the North African power systems to pursue smaller, incremental 
efforts to integrate RES-E, and possibly focus on more locally based power system 
cooperation.  
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